Verifiable storage allows a cloud customer to check whether her (Big) data is stored correctly at the cloud server provider. As previously mentioned, classical data integrity techniques are not suitable anymore since they require the customer to download the entire data together with the integrity proof computed by the cloud. TREDISEC tackles this specific problem and currently investigates existing solutions that can be classified into two categories: Proof of Data Possession (PDP) and Proof of Retrievability (PoR).
- WP31-R1: Efficient storage verification
- WP31-R2: Data possession verifiability
- WP31-R3: Data extractability
- WP31-R4: Delegated verifiability
- WP31-R5: Public verifiability
To avoid client-side deduplication attacks, the new primitive called Proof of Ownership (PoW) was introduced with the aim of preventing leakage amplification in client-side deduplication. More specifically, the idea is that if an outside adversary somehow obtains a bounded amount of information about a given target user file F via out-of-band leakage, then the adversary cannot leverage this short information to obtain the whole file F by participating in client-side deduplication with the cloud storage server.
One of the main objectives of the project with respect to verifiability is the study of PoW protocols. There are indeed several open questions when it comes to this family of protocols, mostly revolving around performance and security. In addition, we plan to investigate PoW schemes that can be applied to encrypted data and/or data uploaded by participants that do not share mutual trust.
- WP33-R1: Efficient ownership verification
- WP33-R2: Verifiable Ownership with data confidentiality
Content extracted from deliverable document D2.2 Requirements Analysis and Consolidation